Accounting for undecided and uncertain voters is a challenging issue for predicting election results from public opinion polls. Undecided voters typify the uncertainty of swing voters in polls but are often ignored or allocated to each candidate in a simplistic manner. Historically this has been adequate because first, the undecided tend to settle on a candidate as the election day draws closer, and second, they are comparatively small enough to assume that the undecided voters do not affect the relative proportions of the decided voters. These assumptions are used by poll authors and meta-poll analysts, but in the presence of high numbers of undecided voters these static rules may bias election predictions. In this paper, we examine the effect of undecided voters in the 2016 US presidential election. This election was unique in that a) there was a relatively high number of undecided voters and b) the major party candidates had high unfavorability ratings. We draw on psychological theories of decision making such as decision field theory and prospect theory to explain the link between candidate unfavorability and voter indecisiveness, and to describe how these factors likely contributed to a systematic bias in polling. We then show that the allocation of undecided voters in the 2016 election biased polls and meta-polls in a manner consistent with these theories. These findings imply that, given the increasing number of undecided voters in recent elections, it will be important to take into account the underlying psychology of voting when making predictions about elections.
Introduction
Timely and accurate polls are crucial to describing current political sentiment and trends.
Whilst no one poll will be sufficiently precise to enable reliable election predictions, combining the results of many pre-election polls has traditionally been viewed as a way to provide accurate forecasts. However, bias at the level of the individual poll can produce systematic error in aggregate results. One import source of polling bias arises from undecided voters. In the 2016 US presidential election, a large share of voters remained indecisive up until election day. When large in number, likely voters uncertain in their candidate preferences have the power to determine tight elections. Most polling firms deal with undecided voters using deterministic allocation methods, the most popular being proportional or equal allocation. However, these methods fail to account for the psychological factors at play whilst people are deciding between candidates, and therefore may be systematically biased in their assumptions about undecided voters.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of undecided voters in the 2016 US presidential election. We begin by providing background information on surveys, election polling, and undecided voters. We introduce the data on national undecided voter levels and unfavorability of presidential candidates, and the state-level polling data used in our analysis.
We then motivate our analysis by comparing undecided voters and candidate unfavorability data in previous presidential elections to levels in 2016. We draw on psychological theories of decision making to explain the link between candidate unfavorability and voter indecisiveness, and to describe how these factors likely contributed to a systematic bias in polling that underestimated the extent to which undecided voters would eventually prefer Donald Trump. We then use statistical procedures to decompose the sources of bias in US presidential elections from 2004 onwards. We show that bias in the 2016 US presidential election is critically higher than in the previous presidential elections, and this increase in bias can be accounted for by the high levels of undecided voters. Finally, we discuss our conclusions and recommendations from this work.
Surveys, election polling and undecided voters

Surveys and election polling
The accuracy (or lack thereof) of public opinion surveys 1 and election polls has received substantial attention in recent years. All public opinion surveys are predicated on the assumption that citizens possess well developed attitudes on major political issues, and that surveys are passive measures of these attitudes (Converse and Traugott 1986, Zaller and Feldman 1992) . In practice however, surveys may fail to adequately capture the sociological complexity around voting decisions and behavior (Crossley 1937 , Gelman and King 1993 , Jacobs and Shapiro 2005 , Hillygus 2011 ). Increasingly, modern public opinion surveys also have to cope with challenges from declining response rates (Keeter, et al. 2000 , Tourangeau and Plewes 2013 , PRC 2012 combined with difficulties in achieving complete coverage of the population (Jacobs and Shapiro 2005, Traugott 2005 , Leigh and Wolfers 2006, Erikson and Wlezien 2008) . Robust evidence has demonstrated that the role of statistical uncertainty in the opinion polls has not been adequately understood (Martin, et al. 2005 , Sturgis, et al. 2016 , Hillygus 2011 , Graefe 2014 ) and a failure to fully reflect this uncertainty leads to an over-statement of confidence level in predictions from survey results (Erikson and Wlezien 2008 , Rothschild 2015 , Lock and Gelman 2010 ).
There are a number of factors that influence this uncertainty in election polls. First, although polls play an important role in the democratic process it is becoming increasingly difficult to measure voting intention (Curtice and Firth 2008, Keeter and Igielnik 2016) . Relatedly, there are differences between voting intentions and voting behavior (Wlezien, et al. 2013, Hopkins 1 We use the term survey as opposed to poll to indicate the generality of these statements.
2009, Veiga and Veiga 2004, Jennings and Wlezien 2016) . It is also generally agreed that survey respondents will not be fully representative of the entire voting public. Finally, the disparities in the population result in differences in voter behavior by geography, ethnicity, social class, gender and age, which effectively exacerbates the level of uncertainty when it comes to generalizing from the sample survey to the broader population.
From this perspective, gaining a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that affect the accuracy of polls will provide valuable insights into obtaining better calibration and efficiency of individual polls and the models derived from them.
Undecided voters and election polling
Pre-election polls are typically conducted based on random sampling of likely voters who are asked their preference among the presidential candidates. Most polls record the percentage of voters who are undecided 2 , however dealing with this category is a challenge for prediction models (Hillygus 2011, Hoek and Gendall 1997) .
To begin, we define undecided voters as individuals that are likely to vote but who have not formed a voting intention when surveyed prior to election day. Whilst similar to Kosmidis and Xezonakis (2010) our definition is restricted to likely voters as most election polls make adjustments to report results only for this group (Sturgis, et al. 2016 ).
Many rule-based methods have been proposed to handle undecided voters in elections (Crespi 1988 , Daves and Warden 1995 , Fenwick, et al. 1982 ) however some findings have indicated that various assignment methods may not improve forecast accuracy (Hoek and Gendall 1997) . Simple rules for allocating undecided respondents may be adequate if the undecided voters are small in number but it is hard to accept use of these simple rules when there are 2 Which is not to say they always report the level on undecided voters.
relatively high numbers of undecided voters, as there are likely to be underlying causes and they have a greater chance of affecting the election outcome. Additionally, any deterministic rule will not allow for variability of allocations to be modelled in predictive outcomes, which may be problematic. Limited research into the impact of undecided voter allocation on election poll modelling still leaves many questions about the role of indecisive voters in election polling.
The effect of undecided voters on the assessment of predictive accuracy of election poll has been considered (Mitofsky 1998 , Hoek and Gendall 1997 , Visser, et al. 2000 , Martin, et al. 2005 . But the overall focus in this research has been on treatment of undecided voters so that consistent accuracy measures can be defined, rather than how the allocation assumptions impact the bias of polls. Visser, et al. (2000) state that there is little published "collective wisdom" on undecided voters and better guidelines are needed, especially since excluding undecided voters was the least effective strategy in their analysis.
Investigation into undecided voter behavior has occurred mostly in the context of election campaign assessment. For example, in US and Canada, voters who decide last minute may be more open to persuasion (Chaffee and Rimal 1996, Fournier, et al. 2004) , and in the 2005
British elections, Kosmidis and Xezonakis (2010) concluded that perceived economic competence was a larger driver for the behavior of undecided voters. However, for election outcome modelers, little can be said on the correct treatment of undecided voters for election predictions. Most notably, imputing candidate preferences for undecided voters has been found to be somewhat beneficial in Fenwick, et al. (1982) whilst more recently Nandram and Choi (2008) proposed a Bayesian allocation. However evidence predictive benefits to US presidential elections is not yet clear. We show that more sophisticated evaluation of undecided voters will be necessary for accurate predictions of future US presidential election outcomes.
Meta-analysis of polls
Any one poll will be a snapshot of the sample collected, fraught with difficulties pertaining to sampling design, non-representativeness, and differences in methodological assumptions. For this reason, a single poll should be interpreted cautiously, even more so in situations when there is little previous experience to draw upon, for example in a referendum or, arguably, the 2016 US presidential election. Nonetheless, polling results from various sources can be compiled, compared, analyzed and then interpreted using meta-analysis techniques to combine (or pool) together different polls.
Meta-polls and poll modelling can compensate for the bias and inaccuracy of individual polls, but establishing well-calibrated models require understanding the inherent problems in polls, and defensible model assumptions. In election polling, deterministic (rule-based) allocation of undecided voters is widespread (Crespi 1988 , Visser, et al. 2000 , Martin, et al. 2005 ).
These methods are appealingly simple and create a consistent set of data when polling organizations do not publish the number of undecided or third party voters. Undecided voters can be allocated (explicitly or implicitly) in a number of ways (Martin, et al. 2005 , Mitofsky 1998 ). The most prevalent of these techniques are:
1. Splitting the undecided voters proportionately between the two leading candidates.
This is equivalent to discarding the undecided voters and normalizing the two leading candidate's voter proportions, and 2. Allocating half of the undecided voters to each of the leading candidates. This is equivalent to only reporting the margin between the two leading candidates.
Identifying the allocation procedures that polling firms use (if they do not report undecided voters) is difficult because they are averse to providing more information than necessary in their commercial setting. Some meta-pollsters have published how they handle undecided voters in their models for at least the 2016 election 3 .
Meta-analysis of polls is crucial to obtaining reliable predictions for elections, however, it is very difficult for these models to account for systematic bias in polls. Investigating the role of undecided voters in polling bias will help to control one aspect that contributed to larger bias in the 2016 presidential election, which may occur again. Furthermore, considering psychological mechanisms that account for the voter behavior observed during the 2016 election will provide a direction for modeling in future elections.
Data
We examine the extent to which 2016 was an abnormal election year by considering a) the number of undecided voters, and b) the perceived unfavorability of the candidates relative to 
Was 2016 an abnormal presidential election year?
Comparison of undecided voters in US Presidential Elections
Undecided voters were much higher during the 2016 US presidential election relative to previous years. Figure The levels of undecided voters in 2016 had an unusually high in mean, a larger tail in the distribution, and did not keep decreasing in the week prior to the election. This finding motivates an investigation of the effect of undecided voters on polling, and the potential causes for larger than usual numbers in this group during the 2016 US presidential election.
Figure 2: Histogram of undecided voters, as captured by national polls, over the course of 3 months prior to the US presidential elections 2004-2016. Each bar is relative to the number of polls from that year.
Comparison of candidate unfavorability in US Presidential elections
As we demonstrate, a defining characteristic of the 2016 US presidential election was the considerable unfavorability of both major-party candidates. Favorability ratings are a widespread public opinion tool often used to gauge the public's sentiment toward politicians.
Favorability questions in surveys generally ask respondents to rate a politician on some favorability scale 5 . We use aggregated sample proportions from each poll who respond negatively to a candidate, for example the sum of responses "mostly unfavorable" and "very unfavorable".
In Figure 3 
The psychology of the undecided voter
The analysis presented above reveals that, compared to previous US elections, more people during the 2016 election campaign viewed the candidates as unfavorable and were undecided about for whom to vote. In this section, we use psychological theories of decision making to explain the link between candidate unfavorability and voter indecisiveness, and to describe how these factors likely contributed to a systematic bias in polling.
Candidate Unfavorability leads to Voter Indecisiveness
According to psychological theories of decision making, there is a link between unfavorability and indecisiveness. Psychologically speaking, choices between unfavorable options (e.g., finding the better of two evils) take longer and result in more deliberation and indecisiveness than choices between favorable options. This has been observed in numerous empirical studies (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993, Houston, et al. 1991) . Decision field theory (DFT) (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993) provides a formal explanation for this process. DFT assumes that people make decisions by sampling, one at a time, the consequences of choice options. The person's preference for an action develops over time as he or she considers different consequences. This process continues until the preference for one action is strong enough that it breaches a threshold. The threshold represents the strength of preference required before one commits to a choice. Once this threshold is breached, the deliberation process terminates and the choice is executed. This process, referred to as sequential sampling, is one of the most widely accepted and successful accounts of the decision process (Brown and Heathcote 2008 , Donkin, et al. 2011 , Ratcliff and McKoon 2008 , Usher and McClelland 2001 .
According to DFT, when deciding between favorable options, preference for an option accelerates as it moves toward the decision threshold. In this case, the decision process is self-reinforcing. As the person gets closer to committing to a choice option, the desirable consequences of choosing that option become more salient, which leads the person to prefer that option even more strongly. As a result, the decision process terminates quickly. When deciding between unfavorable options, preference for an option slows down as it approaches the threshold. In this case, the deliberation process is self-negating. As the person gets closer to committing to a choice option, the undesirable consequences of that option become more salient, which leads to hesitation and a reduction in preference for that option. As a result, the person oscillates between options and the decision process takes a long time to terminate. 
Methods
Assessing poll bias with the total survey error framework
We use a total survey error framework (Biemer 2010, Groves and Lyberg 2010) Therefore, the poll error which is computed through comparing the election outcomes to the predictions from multiple election polls, can be decomposed into election level bias and variance terms. We adopt this framework to ensure that the analysis of undecided voters and their role in the bias is not conflated by non-sampling errors.
On the one hand, sampling errors arise from taking a sample rather than the whole population and are usually accounted for using standard survey sampling approaches 9 . On the other hand, non-sampling error is a catch-all term that refers to all other sources of error that are not a function of the sample chosen. In theory, although a specific poll estimate may differ from the true election outcome, under favorable repeated sampling conditions polls should produce reliable estimates (Assael and Keon 1982) . However, in practice, it is well known that differences between poll results and election outcomes are only partially attributable to sampling error (Ansolabehere and Belin 1993) . Most statistical procedures to compensate for non-sampling errors assume near universal (or high) response, but this is far from the norm:
the majority of election surveys have less than 10% response rates (PRC 2012). Further, in polling there is a general difficulty in measuring voting intention and voting behaviour because polls measure what respondents beliefs and opinions are at the time of the survey, they cannot fully capture what respondents will do on election day (Bernstein, et al. 2001, 7 Systematic errors may be shared operational practices, infrastructure and sampling frames for example. 8 Different survey methodologies may be proprietary software, statistical models and weighting adjustment procedures. 9 For example post-stratification (Holt and Smith 1979) , calibration (Deville and Särndal 1992) , imputation (Gelman and Carlin 2002) . Silver, et al. 1986 , Rogers and Aida 2014 , Jowell, et al. 1993 . Increasingly, efforts to mitigate against this can exacerbate the inaccuracy (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012 , Voss, et al. 1995 , Gelman, et al. 2016 , Bailey, et al. 2016 ). This is especially true when it comes to dealing with those who are undecided, either because they are truly undecided, or are hiding extreme voting preferences (Gerber, et al. 2013) . The treatment of the group of polling responses that report to be undecided is therefore an important, yet relatively unstudied area of research.
A Bayesian approach to total survey error incorporating undecided voters
We use a meta-analytic approach to compare the estimates from the individual polls to the eventual election outcomes. This combines together information from the various polls to produce a pooled estimate for the differences between the state-election poll means and the election outcome -which is our ground truth. The modelling framework is based on the model proposed by Shirani-Mehr, et al. (2016) . Their model, following standard practice in the literature, estimates the total survey error through estimating the vote share under a twoparty preference, but does so excluding undecided voters. We extend their model to specifically include undecided voter proportions.
Since there are relatively few numbers of polls in some elections, taking a simple measure from the polls, such as root mean squared error, may yield imprecise estimates of the election-level bias. We address this by fitting a Bayesian hierarchical latent variable model (Gelman and Hill 2007) . This method pools data to determine estimates of bias and variance in states with small numbers of polls, allows bias to vary over time, and better captures the variance in excess of that expected from a simple random sample. The model borrows strength across states and time to estimate smoothed within state trends of both polling bias and undecided voters in each election. AOV 01-02-2017 With small adjustments the notation in Shirani-Mehr, et al. (2016) , each poll is associated with an election denoted by the index [ ]. Let be the two party support 10 for the Republican candidate of poll , be the sample size, and be the time at which the poll was conducted. The time is the duration between the last day the poll was conducted and the relevant election date, and is scaled to be between 0 and 1. The Republican candidate's final two-party vote outcome is denoted by . Each poll is assumed to be distributed by: 1) where N denotes the normal distribution parametrized by mean and standard deviation. In this model the vote, captures the true mean of the polls allowing election level bias to be estimated by + . Bias on election day is simply and the time-varying bias coefficient is . As for the variance, accounts for the excess deviation above what is expected in a simple random sample.
The model used is able to detect the bias in election polling at the state level by centring the model about the actual election outcome, whilst estimating the excess standard deviation by anchoring the model variance at the level expected from a simple random sample when the election outcome is known. Elections with few polls are estimated by pooling the data across elections using hierarchal priors.
By using two-party support the model implicitly assumes that undecided voters measured in polls are distributed proportionately to the major-party candidates. We relax this assumption by explicitly distributing the undecided voters in proportion but with flexibility. To illustrate, 10 Two party support meaning that proportionate allocation of the undecideds has been implemented.
take the Republican and Democratic support as measured in poll , and respectively.
Scaling the polls to exclude third party candidates, we assume that
where 0 ≤ ≤ 1 allocates the undecided voters to the Republican candidate. Rather than using = + or in other words proportionate allocation as is the case in model (1), we use
where is an unknown bias (away from proportionate allocation) which occurs at some level (i.e. poll, election or election year). Simplifying equation (2) with (3) The term measures the bias away from a proportional two-party split. However, using polllevel undecided voters as an explanatory variable is problematic for two reasons; it is subject to measurement error and the level of undecided voters varies over time (see Figure 1 ). The latter issue may confound with estimates of the time-varying component of bias already in the model, .
To address these concerns we propose a model for the undecideds so that election day undecided voter levels can be included in model (1), rather than the undecided numbers from each poll. The model of the undecided voters is: 
where has replaced in (3) and is the bias attributable to mean undecided voters from each election-year. The coefficient is not estimated at the election level because of identifiability issues with which is retained for compatibility with model (1). In addition to accounting for measurement error, using (4) also allows polls that do not report undecided voters (i.e. they have missing data) to still be included in the model since only the state-level mean enters model (5). To ensure that the final inference is not substantially affected by the choice of prior, we specify weakly informative priors 11 , following Shirani-Mehr, et al.
(2016), on the polling and undecided model mean and variance terms. The priors can be found in Table 3 in Appendix A.
Results
First, we compare our results from election years 2004 to 2016 with results obtained by Shirani-Mehr, et al. (2016) for 2000 to 2012 using the model specified in (1). In Table 1 overall distribution across all polls. For states with few polls, the estimates for these states can be inferred from information from other polls (across state and time). 12 See Appendix B for mathematical definitions. Average absolute bias 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% 2.7% 1.6% 1.0%
Average absolute election day bias 0.8% 1.0% 1.3% 2.4% 1.4% 1.0%
Average standard deviation 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% Secondly, we examine the average results from the model including undecided voters in (5).
This model includes an effect for the bias attributable to undecided voters on election day.
The results from model (5) are presented in Table 2 . The election level aggregation of undecided voters in model (5) The average bias quantities in Table 2 Average absolute bias with undecided bias (b) 0.7% 1.1% 1.4% 2.7% 1.5% without undecided bias (c) 0.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.6%
1.2% Average absolute election day bias with undecided bias (b) 0.7% 0.9% 1.3% 2.5% 1.4% without undecided bias (c) 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% 1.4%
1.1%
Average standard deviation 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 2.5% 2.3%
Average election day undecideds 3.2% 3.8% 3.1% 5.5% 4.0% 
in (5). The model in (5) includes a linear term for the bias attributable to undecided voters on election day. This term is included in quantities for rows with superscript (b) and exclusion is indicated by (c).
To further 
Discussion
While there have been methodological advances in election polling and modeling over time, perhaps due to the rapidly changing news cycle and the multi-faceted role of media, measuring public opinion is still difficult. As such, polls and meta-polls can be inaccurate.
For example, polls have 'failed' to accurately predict winning candidates (according to the media) in several recent elections, such as the 2015 British election, the Scottish independence referendum, the Brexit referendum, the 2014 US House elections and the 2016 US presidential election. Our analyses revealed that one important source of bias in the polls is undecided voters. Undecided voters biased polls in the 2016 US presidential election by 2-3% (all things being equal). This bias is particularly problematic given the increasing number of undecided voters observed in our analysis. We found that in 2016, 5.5% of voters were undecided on election day up from 3-4% in previous years. Others have also found that the percentage of voters who are undecided in the final week of an election campaign is high (up to 30% in some countries) and may be increasing (Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008 , Gelman and King 1993 , Orriols and Martínez 2014 . Given the rising prevalence of undecided voters, and the bias they may introduce to polling, more attention needs to be given to this group when predicting election outcomes.
It is well known within the survey research community that, polls suffer from both sampling (due to the fact that information has been collected from a sample rather than everyone in the population) and non-sampling (due to the fact that there is underlying differences in voting behavior and voting outcomes) errors. Statistical and operational adjustments compensate for sampling errors, but in reality it is the non-sampling errors that play a significant role in the discrepancies between the poll results and election outcomes. The total survey error approach provides a methodology for capturing both types of errors. We have used this approach to understand, interpret and report the various sources of error that in exist in election polling.
We have focused specifically on undecided voters, and provide evidence that found that there was substantial differences in the degree of undecidedness in pre-election polling in the 2016 US election. Since the majority of polling agencies had no specific methodology to include this in their predictive models, the reported results over-estimated the lead of the Democratic candidate, Clinton, against the Republican candidate, Trump. Our results show that voters who were undecided at the time of being surveyed tended to behave differently to those who decided which party or candidate to vote for earlier. Although it is well recognized that undecided respondents contribute to polling error, there is no consensus about the inferences that can be drawn from their data (Henderson and Hillygus 2016 , Fenwick, et al. 1982 , Hillygus 2011 ) but our research has demonstrated the impact a failure to adequately include them can lead to inaccuracies in polling predictions. We argue for probabilistic allocation of undecided voters in the future, so that this uncertainty can propagate through election models.
Our findings highlight the need to consider the psychology of decision making to make informed predictions about the behavior of undecided voters. High levels of perceived candidate unfavorability lead to greater indecisiveness, because voters oscillate back and forth between options over time, reluctant to commit to either candidate. When voters eventually make a decision, having unfavorable views of the candidates leads people to, all else being equal, prefer high risk options. Taken together, these psychological phenomena explain the higher-than-expected preference for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election. They also explain why standard methods of dealing with undecided voters such as proportional or equal allocation were systematically biased against Donald Trump. Given the increase in voter indecisiveness over the last four US presidential elections, it will be important for polling firms to be aware of the underlying psychology of voter behavior when making predictions about elections.
Despite the novelty of our findings in ascertaining the role of undecided voters and the adoption of the total survey error framework, our analyses has some noteworthy limitations.
Firstly, our models remain associational and only provide evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the increase in undecidedness and polling accuracy.
Properly understanding the underlying effects, and causal mechanisms surrounding how indecision directly influences election outcomes will require more complex psychological decision theory and models. 
Appendix B: Average bias quantity calculations
The definitions of average bias quantities presented in Table 1, Table 2 , and Figure 5 are taken from Shirani-Mehr, et al. (2016) where appropriate. Using the updated notation in this paper the average election-level polling bias from model (1) is given by
where is the set of polls from state-level election , and | | denotes the size of the set .
This also represents the average election-level polling bias when excluding bias from undecided voters in model (5). When including undecided voters the bias is expressed as
Similarly, election day bias is defined with = 0 so it is captured by − when including undecided voters and otherwise. The term measures the bias attributable to the undecided voters in each election. The average absolute quantities of , , , and − can be calculated for a set of elections by taking the absolute value for each election and averaging.
The average election-level polling standard deviation is given by
and the average for a group of elections can be calculated based on these quantities.
